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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

)

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND)
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING,

)

Respondent/Appellee

)

Administrative Case No.
DOPL-2002-123
Appellate Case No. 20050894-CA

vs.

)

ANTONE R. THOMPSON, pro-se

)

Petitioner/Appellant.

)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF APPELLANT THOMPSON
Appeal is from the lesser courts judgements, sentences, findings of fact and
- orders denying Appellant his right to due process of law. The judgements are from
an administrative court in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Co, State of Utah, the Honorable
Judge Steve Eckland for the first two orders, then Masuda Medcalf for administrative
review, presiding:
The Department of Professional Licensing, hereinafter referred to as DOPL.

ANTONE RODNEY THOMPSON
350 S. 500 W.
Cedar City
Utah 84720
Telephone (435)586-1345 FAX
Appellant/Petitioner pro se

(Brief of Appellant Thompson)

ANNINA M. MITCHELL(#2274)
Utah Solicitor General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
P.O. 140854
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-0854
Attorney for appellee, respondent
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THOMPSON

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND

Administrative Case No.
DOPL-2002-123

PROFESSIONAL LICENSING,
Respondent/Appellee

Appellate Case No. 20050894-CA
vs.
ANTONE R. THOMPSON, pro-se
Petitioner/Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, jurisdiction originating with
the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah State Code § 78-2a-3(2)(a)and(b)(i)and(ii)

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows:
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the administrative court erred in denying the
Appellant's Due Process of Law in withholding and telling the
Appellant that they cannot find the transcripts for the original
hearing of The Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, Order and Finding of Fact, Conclusion of Law and
Recommended Order, dated Oct. 27, 1999, Case#: DOPL-98(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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105? This hearing has no transcripts. Therefore, is without facts,
denying the Appellant his right to due process of law.
This the Appellant believes is in violation of the US Constitution,
Amendments V and XIV.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the administrative court erred in denying the
Appellant his right to the DOPL's administrative Two-Day Rule,
that the DOPL is not to present a stipulation to a licensee within
two days prior to a hearing for action against a licensee? The
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Conclusion
of Law and recommended Order on Motion to Set Aside
Stipulation and Order, dated 16th of Feb., 2005, Case#: DOPL2002-123; was in violation of the administrations own Two Day
Rule, that no stipulation will be allowed unless presented to the
licensee prior to two days before a hearing. This stipulation was
placed before the Appellant at the hearing without adequate time
to read the stipulation and while the Appellant was under
medication for an excruciating toothache(percocet). The
Applicant was under threat, duress and coercion. This the
Appellant believes is in violation of the Utah Administration Act.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the administrative court erred when they
admittedly impaired the obligation of a stipulation or contract: US
(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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ngineers

examination and having worked for four years under professional
engineers, he received his Professional Engineers License.
Appellant has worked as an engineer for fifteen years without
any failure, lawsuits or to his knowledge any unhappy clients.
Appellant believes this is in violation of US Constitution,
Amendment V and IV, deprivation of liberty and property without
Due Process of Law.

STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to
questions of law and the interpretation of statue and procedure of "clearly erroneous"
as it applies to questions of fact. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 and State v.
Rhoades, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Gibbons. 770 P.2d
1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerrald, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978).
The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence in this
determination which typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. An administration court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See
State v. Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, fl 11, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999
UT 96,fl 20, 989 P.2d 52), cert. Denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive but believes

(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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the following apply:
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-(2)(l) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-(2)(4) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37(d)-4 (Utah 1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37(d)-5 (Utah 1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(1) (1953, as amended)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is an administrative case involving the issues of the
denial of liberty and property of a Citizen of the United States of America. The
Appellant was contacted by an investigator of the DOPL in 1998 regarding a letter
that the Appellant stamped and signed regarding the structural member sizes that
a contractor showed on his sketches for an addition to a metal building in Cedar City,
Utah.
The investigator told the Appellant that he would be cited for aiding and
abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture. Then said, "if you aided and abetted
the unlicensed practice of architecture, I guess I need to charge someone with
practicing architecture without a license, it looks like you(Appellant) was a target
here". He then told the Appellant that "there was someone in a high position that was
after him (Appellant)". The investigator then discovered who was practicing
architecture without a license and charged him as well. The contractor that was

(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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charged with practicing architecture without a license said "how am I guilty of
practicing architecture without a license for sketching up a design of what the owner
wanted to do with an addition to his building, then going in to the building inspector
to ask what I needed to do to get a building permit and the inspector told me to go
to Toney Thompson to get a letter and he would give the owner a building permit?"
Then the investigator told him this is like a traffic ticket, you can either plead guilty
and pay the fine or you can fight the issue in court, you choose. The contractor
signed the guilty plea, paid the fine and went his way. The Appellant also wanted
to do likewise, plead guilty, pay the fine and go on his way. However, the Appellant
didn't believe that he was guilty of the citation. After the Appellant talked to an
attorney, who reminded the Appellant that the Iron Co. Attorney, Scott Burns (a
golfing buddy of the DOPL investigator), could press charges against him for aiding
and abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture after he signed the plea
agreement, which appellant understood would be $2000 fine and 6 months in jail.
The Appellant decided to fight for his innocense.
Scott Burns was involved with the Appellants daughters case in 1997, where
a man had followed his 12 year old daughter on her paper route and sexually
assaulted her. The Appellant was approached by Scott Burns after the assault, and
told the Appellant that he should drop the case against the assailant, "as he just
wants to go to jail, and that it would just cost the county money". The Appellant told
Scott Burns that" I don't want to be party to the action of this man when he assaults
(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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another little girl, that I want him off the streets as long as he can". After the
Appellant obtained the amount of $2,500 for his daughters corrective counseling, he
took the assailant to court, where Scott Burns told the judge that Mr. Thompson
(Appellant) just wants the money so he can buy a car. After an attorney told the
Appellant that Scott Burns actions in court constituted deformation of character. The
Appellant tried to obtain the video tape of the hearing, but Scott Burns had checked
out the video tape and lost it. The Appellant was not able to take action against Scott
Burns. In 1998 the Appellant got a speeding ticket where Scott Burns was the
prosecuting attorney. The Appellant fought the speeding ticket with a number of
questions about the ticket. Scott Burns issued a warrant for the arrest of the
Appellant and held him in a masonry cell without bedding or amenities, only a roll of
toilet paper for a pillow, with the temperature turned down low, for three days. Scott
Burns held the Appellant three days in solitary confinement with the exceptions of
guards coming to interrogate, who unnecessarily physically assaulted the Appellant
from time to time. After being released the Appellant tried to obtain prison records
through GRAMA requests of the Appellants stay in the Iron County Correctional
Facility. The Appellant was told that "the only records he could obtain were the
records approved by Scott Burns". These are the reasons the Appellant didn't just
plead guilty and pay the 1997 Citation by the DOPL. The Appellant had every reason
to believe that Scott Burns would pursue addition action against the Appellant if the
Appellant plead guilty and paid the fine, ie.$2000 fine and six months in jail, most
(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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likely under Scott Burns. The Appellant did not believe that he was guilty of Aiding
and Abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture.
The State of Utah dismissed the charges against the Appellant of Aiding and
Abetting the Unlicensed Practice of Architecture. The investigator for the DOPL then
cited the Appellant for Unprofessional Conduct of Aiding and Abetting the
Unlicensed Practice of Architecture. A hearing was held, which the Appellant was
not allowed his witnesses or evidence and has been told that there exists no
transcripts for the hearing where the Order placing the Appellant's license on
probation was made, noted as the "The Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, Order and Finding of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommended Order,
dated Oct. 29,1999, Case#:DOPL-98-105". Then approximately six years later the
DOPL held a hearing on Jan. 12,1995, for the purpose of revoking the Appellants
license. At which time the DOPL, in violation of their own Two-Day-Rule presented
the Appellant a stipulation. The hearing Jan. 12, 1995, was held at 10:00 am. The
DOPL presented the stipulation. There was some discussion as to a 30 day stay of
the stipulation, where the attorney for the DOPL made the changes. The DOPL
presented the stipulation again at approximately 10:10 am after which there were a
number of interruptions, which left insufficient time to read or review the stipulation.
The Appellant wrote his name to the stipulation at approximately 10:25 am. DOPL
was aware that the Appellant had not read the stipulation that the Appellant was
acting different, not quit right. The Appellant was under threat, duress and cohesion,

(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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being made aware that the DOPL's intention of revoking his license and that the
Appellant was medicated on percocet for a toothache. The DOPL, the day after they
signed the stipulation violated their own stipulation, by posting the suspension of the
Appellant's license on the DOPL website, after Appellant was told he had 30 days
before his license would be suspended. Appellant within three days rescinded the
stipulation for cause and or fraud. The DOPL acknowledged violating the stipulation,
yet offered no relief or award. The Appellant is now appealing the legal proceedings
of the DOPL.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about the 3rd day of Feb., 1998 the Appellant was cited for Aiding and
Abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture.
2. On or about the 5th day of Mar., 1998 the State of Utah Dismissed the
charges of aiding and abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture against the
Appellant.
3. On or about the 15th day of May, 1998 the DOPL cited the Appellant for
unprofessional conduct of aiding and abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture.
4. On or about the 12th day of Jan.,2005 the DOPL entered into a stipulation
with the Appellant.
5. On or about the 13th day of Jan.,2005 the DOPL violated the stipulation that
they wrote and entered into with the Appellant.
(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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6. On or about the 13th day of Jan., 2005, the Appellant received his copy of
the DOPL's signed stipulation.
7. On or about the 18th day of Jan.,2005 the day after MLK holiday the
Appellant sent the DOPL his intentions of rescinding the stipulation for cause and or
fraud, that they openly had violated.
8. On or about the 12th day of Feb.,2005 the DOPL held a hearing excusing
themselves for violating the stipulation that they wrote and signed.
9. On or about the 6th day of Apr., 2005 the DOPL denied a stay of
enforcement of the stipulation of Jan. 12,2005. Even though the Appellant had met
all requirements to practice as a licensed engineer and had practiced for 15 years.
Without any failures, lawsuits or unhappy clients to his knowledge.
10. On or about 4th of Aug., 2005 the Department of Commerce withdrew their
judicial/agency review of the DOPL.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A
The administrative court erred in not keeping the transcripts of the original
hearing against the Appellant, denying him due process of law. Had the transcripts
been kept they would have shown that the DOPL did obstruct the Appellants ability
to obtain an administrative attorney. Months prior to the hearing the Appellant was
in a meeting with an administrative attorney who listened to his side concerning the
Aiding and Abetting the Unlicensed Practice of Architecture. The attorney told the
(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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Appellant "Mr. Thompson who did you piss off' the Appellant told the attorney about
Scott Burns, Iron County Attorney and the attorney said "say no more, I know all
about Scott Burns". The attorney called the DOPL on conference calling. The
administrator told the attorney to take conference calling off so that he could talk to
him privately, which he did. A few minutes later the attorney told the Appellant that
he was not able to represent the Appellant because it looked like the DOPL had a
personal issue with the Appellant.
The missing transcripts would have shown that one of the DOPL board
members, which was acting as jury in the original hearing, said "this matter with the
Mr. Thompson (Appellant) is too trivial to bring before the Board of Professional
Engineers, that the building inspector should have just called Mr. Thompson
(Appellant) and resolved the matter right then and there without having all this to do".
The administrator with the DOPL then told that board member that he needed to talk
to him in private, at which time the board member was taken out of court, briefed and
was brought back in with an entirely new disposition.
The missing transcripts would have shown that the Appellant was denied his
rights to witnesses that had first hand knowledge of the facts. That he was denied
his exhibits and affidavits of the facts.
The missing transcripts would have shown that this administrative court ruled
against the Appellant without hearing the evidence, testimonies and witnesses.

(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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B

The Stipulation imposed upon the Appellant at the day and hour of the
hearing did violate the DOPL's own standards and rules, that of the Two-day-rule,
stating: The DOPL is not to enter into any stipulation with a licensee within two days
prior to a hearing, and there is probably a good case as why they put this rule into
their documents. The Appellant is sure that if he had more time he could find the
court case that implemented the two-day-rule. That the stipulation was arbitrary,
capricious, without merit or reason, vague, ambiguous and misleading, and
therefore, the DOPL did err imposing the stipulation.
C

That the DOPL did err in denying the Appellant a stay of the stipulation, not
having any good grounds to deny the Appellant the ability to practice. Imposing a
guilty until proven innocent doctrine. Knowing that the Appellant has graduated from
the University of Utah, successfully passing the Engineer in Training, the
Professional Engineers Exam and filling his four years work in training under a
licensed engineer. That the Appellant has no failures in his designs or work, no law
suits against him for his engineering, or to his knowledge no unhappy clients.
Therefore, a stay of the stipulation until he has had his day in court or until he had
his due process of law would be required of the DOPL.
D

(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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The Department of Commerce did err in not holding the DOPL accountable
for acts violating their own rules, as well as allowing the DOPL to violate their own
stipulation which they wrote, without any penalties or consequences.
ARGUMENTS
A

The administrative court erred in not keeping the transcripts of the original
hearing against the Appellant denying him due process of law. This the Appellant
believes is in violation of the US Constitution, Amendments V and XIV.

B

The Stipulation that was imposed upon the Appellant at the day and hour of
the hearing. This violate the DOPL's own standards and rules that of the two-dayrule, stating that the DOPL is not to enter into or offer any stipulation within two days
prior to a hearing, and there is probably a good case as why they put this rule into
their documents.
C

That the DOPL did err in denying the Appellant a stay of the
stipulation, not having any grounds to deny the Appellant the ability to practice.
Denying the Appellant his due process of law, taking liberty and property without
(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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due process of law, this is believed to be in violation of US Constitution,
Amendment V and IV.
D

That The Department of Commerce did err in not holding the DOPL
accountable for acts violating their own rules and for allowing the DOPL to violate
their own stipulation which they wrote, without any penalties. The DOPL violated
their own written stipulation and admitted to this, which the appellant believes is in
violated the US Constitution, Article I § 10, Impairing the obligation of contracts.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

There are a lot of underlying issues beneath the surface and a lot of
circumstantial evidence that leads the Appellant to believe that the action against
him has nothing to do with engineering and everything to do with retribution.
The relief the Appellant is seeking is:
Judgement reversing the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing,
Order and Finding of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommended Order, dated
Oct.,27 and 29,1999 or a Trial De Novo.
And, or
Judgement reversing the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing,
Conclusion of Law and recommended Order on Motion to Set Aside Stipulation and
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Order, dated 16th of Feb.,2005, Case#:DOPL-2002-123 and or Trial De Novo.
And, or
Judgement reversing the Department of Commerce, Finding of Fact,
Conclusion of Law, Order Granting Motion to Strike, and Order on Review, dated
Aug. 4,2005 and or Trial De Novo.
And, or
Judgement reversing The Department of Commerce, Order Regarding Stay
Request, dated 6th April,2005, case#:DOPL-2002-123.

This Brief for Appeal is made timely and in good faith by:

ntone Rodney Thompson, Petitioner pro se

(Brief of Appellant Thompson)
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief for appeal was hand delivered to the following:
ANNINA M. MITCHELL(#2274)
Utah Solicitor General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
P.O. 140854
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-0854
Telephone: (801)366-0180
Utah Court of appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit A

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF
ANTONE R. THOMPSON
TO PRACTICE AS A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. DOPL-98-105

Appearances:
Jeffrey C. Hunt for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Antone R. Thompson for Respondent
BY THE BOARD:
A September 21, 1999 hearing was conducted in the aboveentitled proceeding before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law
Judge for the Department of Commerce, and the Professional
Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Board. Members of the
Board present were Charles Henry Richardson, Barry C. Anderson,
Robert Knox, Hardin A. Whitney, Scott F. McNeil and Stanley S.
Postma.
The remaining Board member (Kenneth Lawrence DeVries) was
not present when the hearing began.

Accordingly, Mr. Devries did

not participate as a Board member in this proceeding.

A. Gary

Bowen, Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, joined the hearing in progress.
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received.

The Board,

being fully advised on the premises, now enters its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and submits the following Recommended
Order for review and action by the Division:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this

proceeding has been, licensed to practice as a professional
engineer in this state.

Respondent was initially licensed on

February 21, 1989.
2.

John Pace, a Cedar City businessman, submitted a set of

commercial construction plans to the Cedar City Building
Department on January 25, 1998 to obtain a building permit.

The

plans were construction drawings for a new warehouse and showroom
designed as an addition to an existing structure.
3.

Glenn Scott Jensen, a licensed general contractor, had

prepared the just-described plans at the request of Mr. Pace.
Mr. Jensen is not licensed as an engineer or architect. The
construction drawings which Mr. Jensen prepared do not contain
the seal of any licensed professional engineer or architect.
4.

The construction plans which Mr. Pace submitted to the

Cedar City Building Department included a January 14, 1998 cover
letter, prepared by Respondent, which recites that Mr. Jensen had
contacted Respondent to provide engineering services relative to
the construction plans.

The letter recites Respondent "reviewed

the plans and approved the structure as shown on the plans".
5.

Respondent signed the January 14, 1998 letter and he
2

also affixed his professional engineer seal to that letter.
Respondent attached a six (6) page addendum to the letter. The
attachment consists of generic notes which set forth general
engineering specifications relative to concrete, steel, masonry
and wood materials.
6.

The various specifications set forth in the attachment

to the January 14, 1998 letter indicate those specifications
would conform to the 1994 edition of the Uniform Building Codes.
However, the 1997 Code edition governed all construction in Utah
when the plans in question were submitted to the Cedar City
Building Department.

The specifications set forth in the general

notes attached to those plans are not consistent with those 1997
Code requirements.
7.

Based on the substantial and credible evidence

presented, Mr. Jensen designed and prepared the construction
plans in question without Respondent's supervision or oversight.
An engineer's review and seal of those plans was required to
obtain a Cedar City building permit.

Based on the substantial

and credible evidence presented, and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, the January 14, 1998 letter constitutes
Respondent's approval of the plans as drawn by Mr. Jensen.
8. Cedar City building officials reviewed the plans and
determined they were not accurate and complete. Accordingly, no
building permit was issued based on those plans.

3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
U.C.A. §58-1-401(2) provides the Division may revoke,
suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or private
reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license of any licensee
who:
(a) . . .has engaged in unprofessional
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under
this title;
(b) . . . has engaged in unlawful conduct
as defined by statute under this title.
Section 58-1-501 (1) (a) generally defines unprofessional
conduct to include:
. . . practicing or engaging in,
representing oneself to be practicing or
engaging in, or attempting to practice or
engage in any occupation or profession
requiring licensure under this title if the
person is:
(i) not licensed to do so or not exempted
from licensure under this title . . . .
The Division asserts Respondent engaged in unlawful conduct
because he aided and abetted the unlicenced practice of
architecture when: (1) he approved the construction plans and
affixed his seal on a letter of verification pertaining to the
structural engineering of those plans; (2) he provided
specifications to the plans which were not drawn by a licensed
architect or professional engineer; and (3) he affixed his seal
to plans which were not prepared under his supervision.
However, the Board finds and concludes Respondent would not
have been engaged in the unauthorized practice of architecture

4

had he directly prepared the plans in question.

Such work would

have been incidental to the proper scope of Respondent's practice
as a professional engineer.
Thus, no proper legal basis exists to find and conclude
Respondent aided and/or abetted the unlicenced practice of
architecture merely because he approved the construction plans,
affixed his seal to a letter of

verification pertinent to those

plans, provided specifications to the plans which were not
prepared by a licensed architect or professional engineer and
affixed his seal to the plans which were not prepared under his
supervision.

Accordingly, the Board finds and concludes

Respondent has not violated §58-1-501(1)(a) and no proper basis
exists to conclude he was engaged in any unlawful conduct
relative to the foregoing matters.
The Division next asserts Respondent engaged in
unprofessional conduct because he aided and abetted the
unlicenced practice of architecture when he knowingly approved
and affixed his seal to construction plans which had been
prepared by an unlicenced person not under his supervision.
Consistent with the above-stated analysis, the Board similarly
concludes no legal basis exists to find that Respondent was
engaged in such unprofessional conduct violative of §58-1501(2) (a) .
However, §58-1-501(2) defines unprofessional conduct to
include:
5

(g) practicing . . . an occupation or
profession regulated under this title through
gross incompetence, gross negligence or a
pattern of incompetency or negligence.
§58-22-603 sets forth the manner in which a professional engineer
or professional structural engineer is authorized to use a seal,
to wit:
(1) A professional engineer or
professional structural engineer may only
affix the licensee's seal to a plan,
specification, and report when the plan,
specification and report:
(a) was personally prepared by the
licensee;
(b) was prepared by an employee,
subordinate, associate, or drafter under the
supervision of a licensee, provided the
licensee or principal affixing his seal
assumes responsibility.
Moreover, §58-22-102(16) further provides:
"Supervision of an employee, subordinate,
associate, or drafter of a licensee" means
that a licensed professional engineer,
professional structural engineer, or
professional land surveyor is responsible for
and personally reviews, corrects when
necessary, and approves work performed by any
employee, subordinate, associate, or drafter
under the direction of the licensee, and may
be further defined by rule by the division in
collaboration with the board.
R156-22-102 thus provides:
(11) "Unlicensed employees, subordinates,
associates, or drafters of a person licensed
under this chapter" means persons not
licensed as a professional engineer who
perform professional engineering . . .
services under the direct supervision of a
licensed professional engineer . . . and who
do not offer professional engineering or
6

professional land surveying services directly
to the public.
The structural engineering services which Respondent
provided and the specifications which he submitted with the
January 14, 1998 letter are critically deficient in numerous
respects.

The drawings are inaccurate and totally inadequate as

to permit any structure to be properly built according to those
specifications.

Thus, Respondent engaged in grossly negligent

conduct violative of §58-1-501 (2) (g) .

Such conduct constitutes

an extreme departure from the standards of practice governing all
professional engineers.
Further, Respondent violated §58-22-603(a) when he affixed
his seal to the construction drawings in question when he had not
prepared those drawings and the drawings had not been otherwise
prepared under his supervision.

Accordingly, a further factual

and legal basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to
Respondentf s license.
The Board duly notes Respondent's urgence that he assumed
Cedar City building officials would contact him after they had
reviewed the plans and specifications to thus identify any
deficiencies which they noted as to prompt subsequent changes or
additions to those plans and/or specifications.

Nevertheless,

Respondent's January 14, 1998 letter unambiguously recites that
he reviewed the plans and he approved the structure as shown on
those plans.
7

Given the numerous deficiencies in the plans and
specifications, the Board readily finds and concludes Respondent
either did not understand or he cavalierly ignored the fact that
he has no authority to approve plans. Moreover, Respondent failed
to either prepare plans and specifications which were sufficient
as to possibly prompt the subsequent issuance of a building
permit or he failed to supervise the preparation of such plans
and specifications.
Respondent cursorily reviewed the plans prepared by Mr.
Jensen and affixed his seal to the plans without any meaningful
review of those plans.

Further, Respondent merely attached

generic specifications to the plans.

Given his wholly inadequate

review of the plans and his entirely unwarranted reference to
boiler plate specifications that did not comply with governing
Code requirements, Respondent knew or should have know that he
could not affix his seal to those plans.
There are two aggravating circumstances which must be
considered regarding the disciplinary sanction which should be
entered in this proceeding.

Respondent is either unable or

refuses to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct.
Moreover, Respondent has substantial experience as a professional
engineer.

Accordingly, he should have been well aware of the

nature of review or supervision necessary as to warrant any
submission of the plans and specifications.
of the plans was completely unjustified.

8

Respondent's sealing

The Board thus concludes the Recommended Order set forth
below is necessary to address Respondent's egregious failure to
comply with the well-recognized standards which govern all
professional engineers in this state.

The Board concludes

Respondent's continuing practice as a professional engineer must
be adequately monitored to protect the public.

The Board

cautions Respondent that ongoing compliance with the requirements
of the Recommended Order set forth below is essential to maintain
his opportunity to continue practicing as a professional engineer
in this state.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to practice as
a professional engineer in this state shall be suspended.
However, a stay of enforcement shall enter as to that suspension
and Respondent's license shall be placed on probation for three
(3) years, subject to the following terms and conditions:
(1) Within two months after this
Recommended Order becomes effective,
Respondent shall submit a written proposal to
the Board which identifies a peer reviewer
who is available and willing to generally
review any structural or civil engineering
services~which Respondent may subsequently
provide.
(2) The just-stated written proposal shall
also provide for random audits of 20% of the
work performed by Respondent during the
previous six (6) months. Respondent shall
bear the cost of such audits. The plan shall
further provide for similar ongoing audits to
be conducted every six (6) months. Audit
reports shall be provided to the Board every
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six months to reflect the work which has been
reviewed and whether that work has been
performed consistent with the standards which
govern professional engineers in this state.
(3), Respondent shall meet with the Board
during the next regularly scheduled Board
meeting conducted after this Recommended
Order becomes effective. Respondent shall
thereafter meet with the Board every six (6)
months. The Board may modify the frequency of
those meetings as subsequently warranted.
(4) Within three months from the date this
Recommended Order becomes effective,
Respondent shall successfully complete the
Utah Law and Rules Examination for
professional engineers. Documentation shall
be provided to the Division to thus establish
that Respondent has timely satisfied the
just-stated requirement.
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms
and conditions or otherwise violate any statute or rule which
governs the practice of professional engineers in this state,
further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made
whether the stay of enforcement set forth herein should be
vacated and the suspension of Respondent's license become
effective.

On behalf of the Professional Engineers and Professional
Land Surveyors Licensing Board, I hereby certify the foregoing
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order were
submitted to A. Gary Bowen, Director of the Division of*
Occupational and Professional Licensing, on the
^t^L*-**
day
of October, 1999 for his review and action.

Steven E>d.und
Administrative Law Judge
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Exhibit B

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO STRIKE, and
ORDER ON REVIEW

Antone R. Thompson,
PETITIONER

DOPL

INTRODUCTION
Antone R. Thompson ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before
the Department of Commerce ("Department") seeking review of a decision by the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division"), which denied his
request to rescind a stipulation he executed with Division representatives and the Order
based upon that Stipulation.
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 63-46b-12, and Utah Administrative Code, R151-46b-12.

ISSUES REVIEWED
Whether the Division's denial of Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation
was reasonable, and whether information provided by Petitioner through his affidavits
should be stricken as not part of the Division record.

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner became licensed as a professional engineer in this state on

February 21,1989.
2.

On October 29,1999, Petitioner's license was suspended, but the suspension

was stayed in favor of probation for three years provided he complied with certain terms
and conditions. Such discipline was based upon the Division's conclusions that
Petitioner engaged in grossly negligent conduct, by affixing his seal to critically deficient
specifications, which were not prepared by him or under his supervision. According to
the Division, Petitioner's conduct constituted "an extreme departure from the standards of
practice governing all professional engineers."
3.

As one condition of probation, Petitioner was required to identify a peer

reviewer who would randomly audit 20% of his work every six months. Petitioner was
also required to meet with the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors
Licensing Board ("Board") every six months and to complete the Utah Law and Rules
Examination for professional engineers within three months of the 1999 Order.
4.

On June 3, 2002, an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") was issued by the

Division, based on allegations that Petitioner had failed to comply with the 1999 Order.
After lengthy pre-hearing negotiations and discovery, a hearing before the Board was set
for January 12, 2005. Two days prior to the OSC hearing, on January 10, 2005,
Petitioner's then attorney submitted a motion to withdraw as counsel and the motion was
granted.
5.

On the day of the OSC hearing, Petitioner appeared pro se. He engaged in

discussions with the Division's counsel about the terms of the Stipulation which was to

resolve all disciplinary actions against him. He and counsel for the Division initialed a
change to Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation, which deleted the language that Petitioner was
represented by counsel. The discussions lasted approximately 40 minutes, after which
the Petitioner and the Division's counsel signed the Stipulation.
6.

The Stipulation provided that Petitioner's license would be suspended for

a minimum of four months, to become effective 30 days from the date the Division
entered an order based upon the Stipulation. The Stipulation further provided that
Petitioner bore the burden of demonstrating to the Division and the Board that he was
competent to practice in order to have the suspension lifted. Additional relevant excerpts
from the Stipulation are as follows:
Paragraph 3. [Petitioner] acknowledges that he enters into this
Stipulation knowingly and voluntarily, and that other than what is
contained in this agreement, no promise or threat has been made by the
Attorney General, the Division, or any member, officer, agent or
representative of the Division or the Attorney General to induce him to
enter into this agreement.
Paragraph 5. [Petitioner] understands he is entitled to [a] hearing before
the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Licensing
Board ("the Board"), at which time he may present evidence on his own
behalf, call witnesses, and confront adverse witnesses. Respondent
acknowledges that by executing this document he waives the right to a
hearing and any other rights to which he may be entitled in connection
with said hearing.
Paragraph 6. A Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause have
been issued in this matter, and the Division and the Respondent agree that
this Stipulation and Order shall be the full and final resolution of all
allegations and claims raised in the Order to Show Cause. If the
Stipulation is adopted by the Director of the Division, no further action
shall be taken by the Division based upon the allegations and claims raised
in the Order to Show Cause.
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7.

The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") briefly discussed the Stipulation

with the parties prior to adjourning the hearing. A transcript of that discussion provides
in pertinent part:
The Court: .. .The Division is represented by Lenore Epstein, Assistant
Attorney General, State of Utah. The Respondent, Antone R. Thompson
is present. And Mr. Thompson, I believe you are representing yourself; is
that correct?
Mr. Thompson: Correct.
The Court: The hearing in this case was scheduled to commence on
January 12,2005 at 10:00 a.m. before the Professional Engineers and
Professional Land Surveyors Board. It is approximately 10:23, and over
the last 30 to 40 minutes, Ms. Epstein and Mr. Thompson have been
reviewing the terms of a proposed stipulation as to resolve this case by
agreement between the parties and eliminate the need for a hearing before
the Board on today's date...
Mr. Thompson, I just wanted to confirm one procedural matter with
relation to all this. It's something you and I discussed briefly when I first
saw you this morning. Mr. Harold Reiser was representing you in this
proceeding, and he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. And I believe
you were aware of that motion; were you not?
Mr. Thompson: Correct.
The Court: .. .Mr. Reiser mentioned yesterday during our discussion that
there was still the possibility this case could be resolved by agreement
between yourself and the Division. And as I've just indicated, that's
exactly what has occurred here in this case. And I believe you have been
provided a copy of that written stipulation; have you not?
Mr. Thompson: Yes.
***

The Court: Mr. Thompson, anything else at this point on your behalf?
Mr. Thompson: No.
(January 12, 2005, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3-6).
8.

By order dated January 16, 2005, the Stipulation was adopted by the

Division Director.
9.

On January 18,2005, Petitioner filed a document entitled "Rescission of

Stipulation." The Division filed a motion to strike Petitioner's Rescission of Stipulation
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and the two motions came for an evidentiary hearing before the Division on February 11,
2005. That hearing is hereafter referred to as the "rescission hearing."
10.

On February 18,2005, the Division issued its Order denying Petitioner's

request to rescind the Stipulation. That Order included various findings of fact, which are
hereby adopted as follows:
Finding No. 4. [Petitioner] appeared for the January 12, 2005 hearing without
legal counsel. Prior to the scheduled commencement of that hearing, Ms. Epstein
and [Petitioner] informed the Court that the parties desired to pursue final
settlement negotiations. The Court granted that request and the parties' review of
a possible stipulation proceeded for approximately forty (40) minutes.
Finding No. 5. [Petitioner] ultimately elected to resolve this proceeding by
agreement and he thus signed the January 12, 2005 Stipulation...
Finding No. 6. Paragraph 10(a) of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation recites that
[Petitioner's] license "shall be suspended for a minimum of four months from the
effective date of this Order." Paragraph 7 of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation
provides that the January 12, 2005 Stipulation and Order will be "classified as a
public document" and that the "terms and conditions of the Stipulation and Order
will be effective thirty (30) days after the date it is signed by the Director."
Finding No. 8. ...Ms. Inglesby [the Division's Administrative Assistant] reviewed
the Stipulation and Order to enter the change in [Petitioner's] license status.
Finding No. 9. Ms. Inglesby noted that [Petitioner's] license was to be suspended
for a minimum of four (4) months. However, she did not locate the provision in
Paragraph 7 of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation that the suspension would not
become effective until thirty days after the date of the order. There are numerous
and lengthy recitals in the January 12, 2005 Stipulation and the provision
suspending [Petitioner's] license is not located in the same paragraph as the one
which identified when that suspension would become effective. Given those
circumstances, Ms. Inglesby mistakenly entered [on the Division's website] the
present status of [Petitioner's] license as being suspended.
Finding No. 10. Ms. Inglesby made the entry for the Division's website on
January 13,2005. The screen with that entry was accessible to the public on
January 14,2005. [Petitioner] subsequently became aware of that entry when a
contractor or other working associate informed [Petitioner] of their belief that his
license was suspended as reflected on the Division's website.
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Finding No. 11. [Petitioner] then filed the "Rescission of Stipulation", which
included the claim that the Division breached the January 12,2005 Stipulation
when the suspension of [Petitioner's] license was prematurely posted on the
Division's website. Ms. Inglesby corrected the erroneous entry on the website on
January 18,2005. Accordingly, the screen accessible by the general public on
January 19,2005 reflected that [Petitioner's] license was on probationary status.
11.

On March 18,2005, Petitioner filed a request for agency review. He also

requested a stay of the Stipulation and Order and submitted his "Affidavit in Support of
Judicial/Agency Review." This first affidavit raises new factual matters including a 1996
incident involving Petitioner's daughter, Petitioner's speeding ticket of September 1997,
and Petitioner's discussions with the prosecutor over both incidents. Petitioner
subsequently submitted two additional affidavits on April 4, 2005, and April 20, 2005.
These additional affidavits and Petitioner's memorandum in support of his request for
agency review express Petitioner's concerns about the terms of the 1999 Order and his
attempts to comply with that Order; they state concerns about lack of due process in the
proceedings that led to the 1999 Order; and state new reasons why the Stipulation should
be set aside. Petitioner has requested oral argument.
12.

On April 6, 2005, an Order was issued on Petitioner's request for a stay,

indicating that a conditional stay order would be entered provided Petitioner first met
certain requirements designed to monitor his practice. To date, Petitioner has not met
those stated requirements.
13.

On April 22, 2005, the Division filed a Motion to Strike Petitioner's

affidavits on the grounds that the affidavits introduce new matters and evidence not made
part of the record below.
14.

Petitioner filed a reply memorandum in which he also responded to the

Division's Motion to Strike.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The standards for agency review correspond to those established by the

Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b16(4). Utah Admin. Code Rl 51 -46b-12(7).
2.

This agency review is from a Division decision denying the Petitioner's

request to set aside a Stipulation that he executed with the Division and now wishes to
rescind. The standard of review from such denial is "abuse of discretion." Martinez v.
Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co., 2005 UT App 297; Richins v. Delbert Chipman
& Sons, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, before such analysis, it is
appropriate to address those matters not properly before the Acting Executive Director.
Hence, the extensive Findings of Fact above and the detailed Section A of these
Conclusions of Law set forth the long historical background of this matter for the purpose
of identifying those issues that are not properly raised by Petitioner.
A.

Petitioner's Arguments
3.

In filing his Rescission of Stipulation, Petitioner included seven counts of

arguments. The first six relate to allegations of misconduct by the Division prior to and
during the hearing that resulted in the 1999 Order and a claim that the 1999 Order
contained vague, ambiguous and arbitrary/capricious provisions. The seventh count
states that the Division's premature posting of Petitioner's license suspension on its web
site was a breach of the Stipulation and therefore requires the rescission of the
Stipulation.
4.

At the rescission hearing, Petitioner explained that he raised the first six

counts in order to establish a trend of misconduct by the Division. He also mentioned
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that he did not have sufficient time to review the Stipulation and that he signed the
Stipulation because he was told by Division representatives that they would seek the
revocation of his license. The Petitioner stated as follows:
Okay. As the Court knows, I didn't have the Stipulation until, like, five,
ten minutes before the hearing. Dan Jones had informed me in the
presence of Lenore [Epstein] that he was going to move for a revocation
of my license, even prior to, you know, to the hearing; that really there
was no evidence I could provide that would take outside the scope of
revocation. And I signed that stipulation on the word of Lenore, that the
Division is solely interested in moving this on and has no intent of injury
tome. And that is my grounds.
I rescinded it within three business days, and is based, even though I
didn't say that in the rescission, was based on Dan Jones's words to me
that, you know, "Mr. Thompson, you're way beyond. It's revocation." I
felt that I - you know, he just doesn't like me. There is no chance here.
And upon Lenore's promise to me that even though the stipulation was
still vague, ambiguous to me, and apparently to some other people here at
the DOPL, that I would go ahead and sign it on Lenore's promise to me.
And I didn't have a whole lot of time to review.
(February 11, 2005, Hearing Transcript, p. 14). Finally, Petitioner claimed that the
Division breached the Stipulation by prematurely posting his suspended status.
5.

Upon agency review, Petitioner's initial memorandum and his affidavits

raise several additional arguments for a rescission of the Stipulation, including the
following:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)

the Division failed to comply with its own hearing procedures by
not entering into the agreement two days prior to the hearing1;
that Petitioner was not represented by legal counsel;
that he was under the influence of pain medication when he signed
the Stipulation and was not competent to enter into the Stipulation;
and
that Petitioner signed the Stipulation under threat, duress, and
coercion from a Division staff member and the Division's counsel.

1

Petitioner refers to the Notice of Notice of Agency Action and Order To Show Cause Hearing, issued by
the Division on June 30, 2002, which specifically states that "any agreement to resolve this proceeding in
lieu of a hearing shall be in writing and executed by the parties no later than two (2) days prior to the
scheduled hearing." This argument by Petitioner is hereafter referred to as the "two-day rule."
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Additional factual matters raised in the affidavits include an incident with Petitioner's
daughter, his speeding ticket, and his discussions with a prosecutor. They also contain
arguments that 1999 Order was vague and arbitrary, that he has in fact complied, and that
he was not given due process in the disciplinary proceedings thai led to the 1999 Order.
Finally, Petitioner cites for the first time on agency review the cases of Bergstrom v.
Moore, 611 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d
716, 725 Utah App. 1990), for the proposition that the Division's premature posting of
his suspended status requires the rescission of the Stipulation and Order.
6.

In his reply memorandum, Petitioner raises yet again new arguments that

the Division has misinterpreted or misapplied the law, the Division has abused its
discretion, and the Division has acted contrary to its own practices.
B.

New Information and Arguments - Motion to Strike Granted
7.

The Acting Executive Director's review is limited to a review of the Division

record. Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-16(4). See also Utah Admin. Code R151-46b12(7). Thus, all new factual information that Petitioner provides in his many affidavits
and his memoranda on agency review, which was not initially raised before the Division,
is an improper attempt to supplement the Division's record. Accordingly, the Division's
Motion to Strike Petitioner's three affidavits is hereby granted.
8.

In addition, legal issues must be raised at the Division level in order to be

properly preserved for agency review. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844,
847 (Utah 1998) ("level of consciousness" test applied to administrative agency case,
requiring a party to raise any issues and allow the hearing officer an opportunity to
correct any deficiencies); Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App.
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1990) (holding that a party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its
right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings, a principle not limited to the trial
court setting but equally to administrative hearings).
9.

Petitioner did not properly preserve for agency review the new arguments

he now raises regarding the two-day rule, not being represented by counsel, being under
the influence of medications, that the Division coerced him into signing the Stipulation,
etc. Petitioner stated at the rescission hearing that he signed the Stipulation after Division
representatives told him that they would seek the revocation of his license, and that he
believed at that point that "[t]here is no chance here." The above statements do not
substantiate a claim of coercion; they allege nothing more than the Division's intent to
seek the revocation of Petitioner's license, and Petitioner's belief that he would not be
successful at the hearing. Moreover, there was no evidence presented by Petitioner that
he was in fact coerced by Division representatives. Because Petitioner failed to bring
these issues to the Division at the time of the rescission hearing, the Division had no
opportunity to examine whether these arguments supported a rescission or setting aside of
the Stipulation. Badger, at 847. By his own failure to raise these arguments, Petitioner
waived them. As a result, such arguments cannot now be considered on agency review.
Id. See also Richins, 817 P.2d at 387 (Court affirming trial court's dismissal of motion to
set aside stipulation and declining to consider movant's arguments raised for the first
time on appeal).

2

The Stipulation even states that Petitioner enters into the Stipulation knowingly and voluntarily and that
no threats or promises were made to induce him to sign the Stipulation. Stipulation, ^ 3.
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C.

Denial of Request to Rescind Was Not Abuse of Discretion
10.

What is left then is the Division's consideration of Petitioner's arguments

stated in his "Rescission of Stipulation" and those he raised at the OSC hearing. A
request for relief from the Division's Order based upon the Stipulation is properly treated
as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.3 Richins, 817P.2dat387. The Richins Court stated:
A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown
[Rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling
only when there has been an abuse of discretion.
Id. Thus, as was previously stated, in determining whether the Division properly denied
Petitioner's motion to set aside the Stipulation and Order, the applicable standard is
"abuse of discretion." Id. A challenge based upon the grounds of abuse of discretion is
reviewed for "reasonableness." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814
P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). "Furthermore, the scope of review of trial court orders
denying rule 60(b) relief is limited.. .the reviewing court will not reach the merits of the
underlying judgment." Martinez, 2005 UT App 297. Therefore, the Acting Executive
Director must determine whether the Division acted reasonably in denying Petitioner's
motion to set aside the Stipulation.
11.

In denying the Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation and Order,

the Division adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions. The ALJ had concluded that

3

That Rule provides that a court may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party from afinaljudgment or
order for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence...;
(3) fraud...., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged...; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 60(b).
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Petitioner's attempts to establish a pattern of misconduct leading to the 1999 Order were
removed in time, and had no rational connection to the validity of the Stipulation; that
Petitioner's concerns regarding the terms of the 1999 Order were resolved by the parties
by the Stipulation; and that Petitioner entered into the Stipulation knowingly and
voluntarily, after ample opportunity to review the proposed terms. He then heard
evidence on Petitioner's allegations that the Division breached the Stipulation to
determine if there was any fraud, misrepresentation or any other misconduct by the
Division so as to warrant a rescission or setting aside of the Stipulation under Rule
60(b)(3). The ALJ concluded that the Division's conduct did not constitute such fraud,
misrepresentation or misconduct, because the website entry was a clerical error and an
honest mistake that was immediately corrected by the Division upon its discovery.
12.

The Division's and ALJ's conclusions were reasonable in this case.

Petitioner's attempts to challenge the 1999 Order were properly rejected. Petitioner did
not file a petition for judicial review of the 1999 Order, and thus gave up his opportunity
to challenge the findings and conclusions that led to that Order. Petitioner's arguments
that the terms of the 1999 Order were vague and arbitrary and his claims that he did in
fact comply with the Order were also properly rejected. Such arguments would have
been appropriate at the OSC hearing. However, Petitioner chose to avoid the OSC
hearing and entered into the Stipulation in lieu of that hearing. The only arguments that
were appropriate at the rescission hearing, therefore, were those provided by Rule 60(b).
13.

Finally, the ALJ considered Petitioner's arguments regarding the

Division's conduct as to the web site posting under Rule 60(b)(3), "fraud,...
misrepresentation, or other misconduct." The Petitioner has not challenged such Rule
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60(b)(3) classification, and such classification was proper under the Richins decision.
Richins, at p. 387. Based upon the testimony presented at the OSC hearing by Division
personnel, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the Division employee made a
clerical error or mistake (failing to notice the 30-day provision within the body of the
Stipulation and Order), rather than engaging in misrepresentation, fraud or misconduct.
14.

On agency review, Petitioner cites to certain Utah cases that rescinded real

estate purchase contracts based upon a statutory covenant against encumbrances.
Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123,1125 (Utah 1984) and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v.
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 725 Utah App. 1990). The Division had no opportunity to rule on
the applicability of Petitioner's legal authority, because Petitioner failed to notify the ALJ
at the rescission hearing of his reliance on these cases. Even if he had, however, it is
unlikely that the ALJ would have found the cases helpful to Petitioner's position. The
courts in Bergstrom and Breuer-Harrison concluded that the seller's failure to disclose
certain easements breached the statutory covenant and thereby the sales contract, thus
requiring rescission of the contracts. In contrast, there is no statute in this case that
prevents the parties to a professional license disciplinary proceeding from stipulating in
lieu of a hearing. The case law more applicable to this matter appears to be that
settlement agreements are generally upheld by the courts. See Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d
205, 206 (Utah 1998) (holding that "settlements are favored in the law, and should be
encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to
the judicial system.")
15.

Similarly, it was not unreasonable to deny Pelitioner's request to rescind

upon the ALJ's findings that Petitioner had sufficient time to review the Stipulation.

13

Petitioner had approximately 40 minutes on the day of the OSC hearing to review the
Stipulation and discuss its terms with the Division's representatives. At the beginning of
the OSC hearing, the ALJ acknowledged on the record that the parties had reached a
stipulation after 30 to 40 minutes of discussions; that they had signed the stipulation; that
Petitioner's counsel had withdrawn; and that prior to his withdrawal, the attorney, had
informed the ALJ that a stipulation could still be reached in lieu of a hearing. Petitioner
confirmed that he was aware of his attorney's withdrawal, that he'd received a copy of
the Stipulation and that he had nothing more to address at that time. Petitioner failed to
inform the ALJ that he was concerned about any of the provisions in the Stipulation, that
he did not have sufficient time to review the Stipulation, or that he disagreed with the
ALJ's representations that they had been engaged in discussions for 30 to 40 minutes.
16.

Moreover, given the history of this matter, it is unlikely that the terms of

the Stipulation came as a surprise to Petitioner on the day of the OSC hearing. The
record indicates that from June 24, 2002, until the OSC hearing scheduled for January 12,
2005, Petitioner had two attorneys. Each of these attorneys had engaged in settlement
negotiations with the Division. As late as January 10,2005, upon withdrawing as
Petitioner's counsel, attorney Harold Reiser informed the ALJ that the matter could still
be settled.
17.

It is important to note that the same ALJ who received the Stipulation and

questioned the parties on the record prior to canceling the OSC hearing was the ALJ who
heard Petitioner's arguments at the rescission hearing. The ALJ recalled the
circumstances leading up to the Stipulation, the discussions held in court, and the
demeanor of the parties:
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... [A]nd I recall it well, we came here for the hearing before the Board
and the decision was made that morning to resolve the case by agreement.
And so there was no evidentiary proceeding conducted before the Board at
the time because the parties had resolved it by that stipulation. Under
these circumstances, and the fact that you elected, having reviewed the
proposed stipulation, to accept it as provided rather than proceed with this
evidentiary hearing before the Board, it strikes me as a freely-given,
intelligent, knowing election on your part to resolve the case in that
manner. And as to that count, I don't see them under those circumstances,
that it has any bearing on the validity of the stipulation for the reasons I've
just stated.
(Rescission Hearing Transcript, p 7 lines 23-25, p. 8, lines 1-16). See also Richins, at pp.
384-385 (noting that the trial court's independent recollection of the original proceedings,
combined with the evidence in the record, supported the conclusion that the trial court did
not clearly err in finding that the stipulation was valid).
18.

In sum, the Acting Executive Director will not consider any new evidence

or arguments raised by Petitioner for the first time on agency review, as her review is
limited to evaluating the Division's record and Petitioner failed to properly preserve
many of his legal arguments for agency review. Petitioner has also failed to prove that
the Division's decision to deny his request to rescind the Stipulation was an abuse of
discretion or arbitrary and capricious. Although the clerical error made by the Division is
regrettable and unfortunate, it was not unreasonable to conclude that this honest mistake
was not sufficient grounds to rescind the Stipulation. Additionally, given the history of
this matter, the parties' prior settlement negotiations, and the Petitioner's opportunity to
review the Stipulation for 40 minutes prior to signing it, it was not unreasonable for the
Division to conclude that Petitioner had sufficient time to review the Stipulation. It is
clear that Petitioner wishes he had not entered into the Stipulation, but such remorse is
not sufficient grounds to set aside an agreement when Petitioner was aware of the
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ramifications of signing the settlement agreement, he was not surprised by any new
terms, and he did not neglect any point in reaching a settlement. Ostler, at pp. 206-207.
As the Division points out, parties are generally bound by their stipulations, and it is their
duty to exercise due diligence and ordinary care, including reviewing a stipulation prior
to signing it. Yeargin, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 20, P.3d 287,292 (Utah 2001).

ORDER ON REVIEW
Because the parties have more than adequately briefed the issues in this case,
pursuant to her discretion in Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(4) and Utah Admin. Code,
Rl 51-46b-12(6), the Acting Executive Director of the Department of Commerce hereby
denies Petitioner's request for oral argument.
The Division's decision denying Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation and
Order entered on January 12, 2005, is hereby affirmed. The parties shall hereafter
conduct themselves in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Stipulation and
Order.
DATED this *f ~ day of{ JUfy*,

2005.

7 .
Frahcine Giani, Acting Exec^ve Director
Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review.
Any Petition for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and
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63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust
administrative remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeous v.
Department of Commerce, et al.9 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the
date of this Order on Review pursuant to Section 63-46b-13.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the Tclay of llpfaM' , 2005, the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Review
by first class mail, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to:

Antone Rodney Thompson
350 S 500 W
Cedar City, Utah 84720
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
J. Craig Jackson, Director
David Stanley, Associate Director
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Lenore Epstein, Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

"TkMtJhl

17

Exhibit C

ROBERT B. SYKES (#3180)
KEVIN M. SHEFF (#8300)
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
311 South State Street, Suite 240
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Attorneys for Antone R. Thompson
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
STATE OF UTAH
)
SUPPLEMENTAL
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE ;I OF RESPONDENT'S REQUEST
OF ANTONE R. THOMPSON TO
]>
FOR AGENCY REVIEW
PRACTICE AS A PROFESSIONAL
]
ENGINEER IN THE STATE OF
;i
(Expedited Hearing Requested)
UTAH
;
i

Case No. DOPL-2002-123

i

Judge Masuda Medcalf

Respondent Antone R Thompson, a licensed professional engineer
("Thompson"), through counsel,filesthis Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of
Respondent's Request For Agency Review.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS1
1.

A Stipulation and Order was presented to Mr. Thompson on

January 12, 2005, the same day a hearing on the merits of Mr. Thompson's case was
scheduled. See Exhibit A.
2.

Mr. Thompson was not represented by counsel at the time the

Stipulation and Order was presented to him moments before commencement of the
scheduled hearing. See Exhibit A
3.

According to the Division's own rules and procedure, stipulations

"... in lieu of a hearing shall be in writing and executed by the parties no later than two
(2) days prior to the scheduled hearing'1 See Exhibit A-3 (emphasis added).
4.

The Stipulation and Order was presented to Mr. Thompson in

violation of the Division's own rules and procedure, and Mr. Thompson was told that
if he did not sign the Stipulation and Order, his license would be revoked. See Exhibit
A; Request For Agency Review, on file.
5.

The Stipulation and Order required Mr. Thompson and the

Division to perform certain obligations. Specifically, the Division was required to
refrain from taking action against Mr. Thompson's license until the expiration of a 30day period. See Exhibit A.

1

Mr. Thompson incorporates all facts stated in his Affidavit, dated
April 4, 2005, all facts stated in his prior request for agency review, as well as
all other documents filed with the Division and regarding the Stipulation and
Order.
2

6.

The Division did not honor its representations and promises to

Mr. Thompson when it took action against Mr. Thompson's license on January 13,
2005.
7.

The Division has admitted it failed to live-up to its end of the

deal, and Mr. Thompson has been damaged as a result of the Division's breach.
8.

Upon learning the Division breached the terms of the Stipulation

and Order, Mr. Thompson exercised his rights under Utah law and timely rescinded
the agreement on January 18, 2005. See Exhibit A.
9.

A determination that Mr. Thompson complied (or failed to

comply) with the terms of the 1999 Order has never been made on the merits.
10.

Mr. Thompson has substantially complied with all of the terms

and conditions of the 1999 Order. See Exhibit A
ARGUMENT
A determination suspending the only means of livelihood known to Mr.
Thompson should be made on the merits. Mr. Thompson should receive a hearing
on the merits underlying the Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause
because the record demonstrates that Mr. Thompson has substantially complied with
all of the terms and conditions required of him by the 1999 Order. 5£ee Exhibit A
There is no factual basis supporting the sanaions imposed upon Mr. Thompson by
the January 12th Stipulation and Order. A hearing should be held to address the
merits of this case and resolve these issues once and for all.
3
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Mr. Thompson has been substantially prejudiced because he was denied
a hearing on the merits as a consequence of some very questionable circumstances.
First, the Stipulation and Order was presented to Mr. Thompson in violation of the
Division's own rules and procedure requiring that it be executed at least two days
prior to the scheduled hearing. See Exhibit A-3 {"Any agreement.. .in lieu of a hearing
shall be in writing and executed by the parties no later than two (2) days prior to the
scheduled hearing."). The Division has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decisionmaking process, and has failed to follow its own rules and procedure regarding
stipulations. See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(e). Mr. Thompson's request for
agency review should be granted.
Second, Mr. Thompson was told that if he did not sign the Stipulation
and Order, his license would be revoked. See Exhibit A. Mr. Thompson's "decision"
to sign the Stipulation and Order was under a direct threat to his livelihood, and he
believed he had no alternative but to sign the Stipulation and Order. Again, the
Division engaged in an unlawful procedure because Mr. Thompson was under duress
at the time he was compelled to sign the agreement or lose his license.
Finally, Mr. Thompson was under the influence of powerful narcotics at
the time he was pressured into signing the Stipulation and Order. Additionally, Mr.
Thompson was not represented by counsel at the time he was presented with the
Stipulation and Order moments before the January 12th hearing. See id.2 Had the
2

Mr. Thompson's attorney withdrew on January 10, 2005.
4

Stipulation and Order been presented to Mr. Thompson at least two days prior to the
January 12th hearing, Mr. Thompson would have had an opportunity to have counsel
review the agreement and advise Mr. Thompson to proceed to a hearing on the merits
or pursue his other legal rights.
The Stipulation and Order was signed in violation of explicit Division
rules and procedure, and was executed under very questionable circumstances
impairing Mr. Thompson's ability to enter into a lawful contract. Given all of these
facts, a hearing on the merits underlying the Notice of Agency Action and Order to
Show Cause should be held. At the very least, the Stipulation and Order should have
been rescinded because there is no dispute the Division breached the agreement when
it took action adverse to Mr. Thompson's license.
I.

THE DIVISION ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. THOMPSON'S
MOTION TO RESCIND THE STIPULATION AND ORDER
BECAUSE MR. THOMPSON IS ENTITLED UNDER UTAH LAW
TO RESCIND THE STIPULATION AND ORDER AFTER THE
DIVISION BREACHED THE AGREEMENT WHEN IT TOOK
ACTION ADVERSE TO MR. THOMPSONS LICENSE.
Even if the Stipulation and Order is found to have been executed

properly and without duress or compulsion arising from the threat made to Mr.
Thompson's livelihood, Mr. Thompson is neveirtheless entitled to rescind the
Stipulation and Order as a remedy for the Division's breach of that agreement. This
remedy is consistent with Utah case law and that of other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Bergstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) (granting rescission when
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seller breached covenant) (citing Tones v. Grow Inv. & Mortgage Co., 358 P.2d 909
(Utah 1961): Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799P.2d 716, 725 (UtahApp. 1990)
(affirming rescission of contract where, although buyers were aware of encumbrance
on property before purchase, they did not understand the legal implications of such
encumbrance until five years after purchasing the property)). The Division erred
when it denied Mr. Thompson's motion to rescind the Stipulation and Order.
There is no dispute the Division violated its obligations under the
explicit terms of the Stipulation and Order when it took action adverse to Mr.
Thompson's license prior to expiration of the 30-day period set forth in the
agreement. This undisputed fact is detailed in the Division's order denying Mr.
Thompson's motion to rescind the agreement. See Order, on file. The fact that this
breach is characterized as a "mistake" does not change the fact that the Division
violated the terms of the Stipulation and Order. Mr. Thompson is entitled to rescind
the agreement, and the Division's failure to recognize this basic remedy is arbitrary
and capricious, and is directly contrary to Utah law.
Mr. Thompson was induced to sign the Stipulation and Order on the
promise that no adverse action would be taken against his license until after 30-days.
Adverse action was taken in violation of that promise. This failure of consideration
renders the Stipulation null and void because the Division failed to live-up to its end
of the deal. Mr. Thompson's request for agency review should be granted and hearing
held on the merits underlying this case.
6

CONCLUSION
Mr. Thompson's request for agency review should be granted because he
has been substantially prejudiced. The Stipulation and Order is not valid given the
questionable circumstances under which it was presented to Mr. Thompson. Even if
it was executed validly, the Division's subsequent breach entitles Mr. Thompson to
rescind that agreement. The Division's unwillingness to recognize Mr. Thompson's
recission remedy under Utah law is arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, it has long
been the public policy of Utah courts and other adjudicative tribunals to resolve issues
on the merits. The many reasons for this sound public policy are obvious, and Mr.
Thompson should be given the opportunity to defend himself on the merits. A
hearing addressing the merits of this case should be held to resolve all of these issues
once and for all. The Stipulation and Order should be vacated, and Mr. Thompson's
request for agency review should be granted.
DATED this 13th day of April 2005.
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,

--**.
N M. SHEFF

C?

^%

Attorneys for Antone R. Thompson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS REQUEST FOR
AGENCY REVIEW were served upon all counsel of record at the addresses listed
below, by e-mail on this 13th day of April, 2005, and by hand-delivery, this 14th day
of April, 2005:
Judge Masuda Medcalf
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
160 East 300 South, Box 146741
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6741
Lenore Epstein
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing
Heber M. Wells Building, 5th Floor
160 East 300 South, Box 140872
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872
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